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ALERT MEMORANDUM

Polish Trends and Soviet Perceptions and Reactions

Military activity in the USSR's three westernmost military districts

manifest the Soviet leaders' growing concern over developments in Poland. The Soviets are likely to give Kania some additional time to master the situation. But if current trends continue unabated and the Polish Party's control over the nation or Poland's role in the Warsaw Pact is called into question, the Soviets will threaten or employ military force.

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Soviet military actions thus far are well short of the requirements for a large-scale military intervention. However, they have increased the preparedness of Soviet forces to mount such an intervention. In addition, they include measures that could be associated with smaller scale military actions such as maneuvers on Poland's borders or within Poland in support of Moscow's efforts to prevent a further deterioration of the Polish situation. [REDACTED]

The Soviets have publicly endorsed Kania and could hardly have expected him to have brought the situation under control within two weeks of his appointment. The situation has continued to deteriorate, and another confrontation between the regime and workers cannot be ruled out. A renewed confrontation could be precipitated by the workers' recent decision to insist on the prompt establishment of a nationwide union organization and/or by their reported intention to call for renewed job actions if they decide that the regime has not made adequate progress in registering trade unions by 15 October. Unless the regime can reverse current trends there is a high probability that the Soviet Union will escalate its political and military pressure on Poland. If the Soviet Union concludes the regime is losing control of the country or that Poland's loyalty to the Warsaw Pact is in question, they will intervene militarily. [REDACTED]

In the immediate future Moscow will mount increased public warnings and heightened propaganda campaigns decrying the new unions, and may arrange visits to Warsaw by high-level Soviet leaders. Moscow will also continue to take measures to enhance its readiness to intervene militarily in Poland. Near-term moves may include increased exercise activity in the westernmost military districts of the USSR [REDACTED]

There are important considerations which argue against Soviet intervention. Either with or without the cooperation of the Kania regime, military intervention undoubtedly would be perceived in Moscow as a last resort. Nevertheless, the geopolitical importance of Poland and Moscow's determination to preserve Soviet influence in the bloc will be overriding considerations. [REDACTED]

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SITUATION REPORTS

POLAND

Party leader Kania's move yesterday toward consolidating his control over the Polish party will, no doubt, be viewed as hopeful by Moscow, which already was voicing a positive view about his chances of placing the Poles' house in order.

Party leader Kania yesterday dismissed from the ruling Politburo Zdzislaw Grudzien, a long-time Gierek associate. Grudzien was also replaced as head of the key party organization in Katowice, a major center of Poland's mining and industry.

His successor is Andrzej Zabinski, a 42-year-old party secretary Kania brought into the Politburo when he became party leader on 6 September. Zabinski was born in Katowice and spent much of his career there. The appointment of a native son is intended to reassure party members in Katowice that their interests will still be well represented in Warsaw.

Kania clearly felt compelled to put his own stamp quickly on a party organization that has long played a special role in Polish political and economic life, especially under Gierek. Kania may have also felt that he could not work well with Grudzien who reputedly is stubborn and not very bright. Kania would also want a man of his own choosing at the head of the Katowice organization to soften opposition to any changes of economic priorities that might adversely affect Katowice.

Moscow's Backing of Kania

[REDACTED] stated that the Soviet leadership has a high regard for new Polish First Secretary Kania and is confident of his abilities. [REDACTED] also asserted that Kania is closely associated with Soviet Politburo member and KGB chief Andropov. These comments accord with other evidence that Moscow supported Kania's selection as party leader and is willing to give him some maneuvering room to resolve Poland's serious problems.

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[REDACTED] Moscow is suspicious that the West is seeking to exploit the Polish situation to weaken the Warsaw Pact. The lack of overt evidence of this [REDACTED] indicates that the behavior of Western countries is much more sophisticated and devious than in past crises in Eastern Europe. He asserted that this is making the job of the Soviet propagandist very difficult. [REDACTED]

The absence of open Western government meddling in Poland has not, of course, stopped the Soviet media from leveling charges against the West of interference in Polish internal affairs. In fact, the frequency and level of such propaganda has increased. An article in today's *Pravda* under the byline of "A. Petrov," a pseudonym used to indicate high-level Soviet party approval, is the most recent and sharpest example. [REDACTED]

In the same vein, for the first time since Kania took power the East Germans have openly expressed their apprehension about what is happening in Poland. A weekly paper published by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has warned that there is no middle path between socialism and capitalism and that every search for one has encouraged counterrevolutionaries. [REDACTED]

In Poland, however, while strikes continue to break out and be settled in various localities, regime [REDACTED] indicates a belief that the situation is improving. [REDACTED] the regime believes changes promised or under way in its official trade unions are causing some workers to have second thoughts about their resignations from them. Key free trade union activists, in any case, will be meeting in Gdansk again on Monday in further preparation for registering their national advisory organization with the authorities. [REDACTED]

Military Situation


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Search for Aid

Poland has requested emergency economic aid from each East European country. Since these countries have serious economic problems of their own, it is unlikely that they will be able or willing to provide Poland with much aid. [REDACTED]

So far, the Kania regime has announced that Czechoslovakia and East Germany have promised to send additional quantities of raw materials, food, and other consumer goods. A high-level Czechoslovak official, however, said that Prague is still undecided about the aid to be given to Poland. Any aid package will be designed to avoid domestic shortages and cutbacks in Czechoslovak exports. East Germany also may have trouble meeting some of its aid pledges. [REDACTED]

Hungarian aid so far has consisted only of additional supplies of edible oil and probably will not include substantially increased exports of meat, which the Hungarians can sell in the West. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia reportedly have agreed to speed up deliveries of food. Since both countries are also facing shortages in their own domestic markets and must meet export commitments, Poland probably will not receive much aid from these sources. [REDACTED]

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